Big Fellow, Long Fellow. A Joint Biography of Collins and De Valera: A Joint Biography of Irish politicians Michael Collins and Eamon De Valera by Dwyer T. Ryle

Author:Dwyer, T. Ryle [Dwyer, T. Ryle]
Language: eng
Format: mobi
ISBN: 9780717157471
Publisher: Gill & Macmillan
Published: 1998-11-19T00:00:00+00:00

During the protracted correspondence between de Valera and Lloyd George, the question of who would represent the Irish side was debated at length in cabinet. It was generally felt that de Valera should lead the delegation, but he declined for several reasons.

For one thing, if Lloyd George tried to use the kind of strong-arm tactics he used in July, de Valera contended the delegation could always use the necessity of consulting him as an excuse to prevent it being rushed into any hasty decisions. There were, however, much broader considerations.

‘There seemed, in fact, at the time to be no good reason why I should be on the delegation,’ he wrote. ‘There was, on the other hand, a host of good reasons why I should remain at home. One had, above all, to look ahead and provide for the outcome of the negotiations. They would end either in a “make” or “break” — in a settlement based on the accepted cabinet policy of External Association, or in a failure of the negotiations with a probable renewal of war. In either case I could best serve the national interest by remaining at home.’

‘If the outcome were to be the settlement we had envisaged, that based on External Association,’ he continued, ‘it was almost certain that it would be no easy task to get that settlement accepted wholeheartedly by the Dáil and by the Army.’ He had already got a taste of the kind of bitterness such a proposal could generate, not only from Brugha’s vitriolic outburst at the cabinet meeting on 25 July, but also during the controversy following his Westminster Gazette interview in the United States. External Association was essentially a more developed version of the idea first propounded in that controversial interview.

By not taking part in the negotiations, de Valera believed he would be in a better position to influence radical republicans to accept a compromise agreement. ‘My influence,’ he argued, ‘would be vastly more effective if I myself were not a member of the negotiating team, and so completely free of any suggestion that I had been affected by the “London atmosphere”.’ In emphasising this point an allusion was made to Woodrow Wilson’s failure to get the United States Senate to ratify the Versailles Treaty following his involvement in the Paris peace talks.

Those negotiating would inevitably have to compromise, but even this might not be good enough in the last analysis. Consequently, by staying at home, he would be in a position to rally both moderates and radicals to fight for an absolute claim, instead of a less appealing compromise. ‘Were there to be a “break” with any substantial section of our people discontented and restless, the national position would be dangerously weakened when the war resumed. I was providing for this contingency much better by remaining at home than by leading the delegation.’

Throughout the struggle his primary role within the movement at home had been as a unifying figure. He had tried to be all things — a moderate among moderates and a radical among militants.

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